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Abstract
We analyse how strategic competition between a green rm and a brown competitor develops
when their products are di¤erentiated along two dimensions: hedonic quality and environmental
quality. The former dimension refers to the pure (intrinsic) performance of the good, whereas the
latter dimension has a positional content: buying green goods satises the consumersdesire to
be socially worthy citizens. Product variants thus comply at di¤erent levels with "green" social
norms. Consumer preferences depend on a combination of hedonic quality and compliance with
social norms. Assuming that the high hedonic quality variant complies less with these norms than
the low hedonic quality variant, we characterize di¤erent equilibrium congurations which appear
as a result of both the intensity of such norms and the willingness to pay for the hedonic quality.
Afterwards, we discuss the policy implications of our analysis.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyse how strategic competition between a green rm and a brown competitor
develops when their products are di¤erentiated along two dimensions: hedonic quality and environ-
mental quality. The former dimension refers to the pure (intrinsic) performance of the good, whereas
the latter dimension has a positional content: buying green goods satises the consumersdesire to
be socially worthy citizens. Finally, these quality dimensions are in conict so that the higher is the
hedonic quality of a good, the lower is the corresponding environmental quality. Also, we consider
whether the attitude of consumers toward green goods can help make policy makers to enhance pol-
icy measures against pollution thereby allowing consumers to play an active role in environmental
protection.1
Two main considerations inspire our analysis. First of all, people are increasingly aware of the
role that their behaviour has on the environment. There is a large strand of literature that states that
consumers care about the impact of their consumption choices on the environment, thus a¤ecting the
quality of life of friends, relatives, and colleagues (Ostrom, 2000; He¤ner et al., 2007; Carlsson et al.,
2010, Deltas et al. 2013). When buying "green" products, people feel that they comply with a social
norm for which such a green consumption behavior is a byword of good citizenship. Consequently, an
environmentally friendly product may contribute to satisfy the desire to stand out as a good citizen
and of being socially worthy (Ostrom, 2000).2 As a such, green goods can be attributed to the
set of positional products which provide buyers with some social/psychological benets beyond the
material needs that products traditionally satisfy.3 On the contrary, when buying "brown" products,
consumers may incur a social stigma as they fail to comply with the norm of responsible citizens.
Green consumption is a byword for good citizenship, likewise brown purchases leads to a blameworthy
social image.4 Since people seek a relative position among peers and buy products also because
of their social value, the higher the quality of the product compared to the alternative, namely its
1 Interstingly, this question has been recently faced by the European Commission: in the Energy Union Package, for
the rst time EU has stated that consumers can play a key role against pollution.
2 If a consumer buys a product which lacks any environmental friendly characteristics, he might have a bad conscience
because environmental awareness is expected from him. (Conrad 2, 2005).
3Notice that this positional content has no direct relationship with the current regulation adopted in a specic
country. Take as an example the automotive emissions standards set by the European Union. Two types of car can
meet the requirements, while having di¤erent emissions levels. From the EU viewpoint, both of them are su¢ ciently
green and therefore do not incur any restriction to circulation. However, from the consumers viewpoint, the less
pollutant the car, the more signicant the contribution to the environment and therefore the better the social image.
4This behavior has been well described since Veblen (1899) by the theory of conspicuous consumption, in which
consumers utility (or status) depends at least partially on the comparison of ones own consumption and goods quality
to that of others. Under conspicuous consumption, buyers are willing to pay a higher price for a functionally equivalent
good in order to reveal their wealth, their social status or other specic characteristics. See Bagwell and Bernheim
(1996) and Bowles and Park (2005) for recent contributions.
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ranking along the quality ladder, the higher its social value and the corresponding position it confers
to the buyer along the social ladder. Therefore, the environmental quality gap between variants is a
measure of the positive (or negative) contribution to environmental protection.5
If this is the case, why are brown products still so popular? In several circumstances, brown goods
meet the consumersrequirements better than the green alternatives. They can have higher levels of
performance than green products (Carrigan and Attalla, 2001; Gupta and Ogden 2009, Weatherell
et al., 2003). For example, conventional internal combustion engine vehicles, although dominated by
green alternatives in terms of polluting emissions, are still superior in most cases to electric or hybrid
vehicles based on pure performance. Paper produced from trees instead of recycled paper is often
preferred because it is softer to the touch; even for short trips, ying is commonly preferred over
taking the train because of time e¢ ciency. Whatever the intrinsic driver to brown consumption, as
Conrad states "there is a trade-o¤ between utility derived from preferred characteristics of a product
and the moral behavior of buying green, expected by part of the society.[...] Producers are aware of
the conict of consumers between preferred characteristics and their environmental incompatibility.
They know that customers, getting their preferred characteristics from an environmental friendly
product, welcome that coincidence but if environmental aspects are missing, they might anyhow buy
the product." (Conrad 2, 2005).
An immediate by-product of the above evidence is that, when the nature of the most preferred
good is not green, its ranking along the quality ladder mainly depends on the importance that people
attach to the environmentally friendly nature of the product as compared to other attributes. The
existence of a conict between the social component of consumption and the individual-rationality-
based motive constitutes the second ingredient of the analysis.6
The modeling framework: a hybrid category of product di¤erentiation
In order to formalize the above evoked ingredients, we dene a market consisting of two rms
providing di¤erentiated goods to a population of consumers. The functionality of a product deter-
mines its hedonic quality so that goods can be ranked along a quality ladder depending on their
performance. The variant characterized by a better (resp. lower) performance is thus the high (resp.
low) quality good in terms of hedonic quality. Nonetheless, the better is its performance, the more
polluting is the good. We assume that, the utility deriving from consuming a product depends also
on the environmental quality gap between this variant and the other available in the market, thereby
5This approach stems from the notion of relative preferences, introduced in the literature by Akerlof (1997). In
Akerlof (1997), the satisfaction of a consumer increases with the di¤erence between the personal status and others
status. Later contribution come from Alexopoulos and Sapp (2006) and Riechmann (2006) with relative preferences
from the point of view of rms. These preferences are also labeled "other-regarding preferences". Ben-Elhadj and
Tarola (2015) apply these preferences to environment.
6Of course, often this conict does not arise. In Ben-Elhadj and Tarola (2015), the consumption behavior is described
under the assumption that a product with high performance is also green. As we explain later, the current paper can
be also viewed as a complement to that analysis.
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nesting the notion of relative preferences in the utility function. While this assumption allows us
to describe the social role of consumption in enhancing environment protection, it makes the choice
between the two variants far from being evident. Indeed, it adds a further dimension of product
heterogeneity with unexpected e¤ects on the traditional mechanism of competition between rms in
a vertically di¤erentiated market.
By denition, in the case of vertical di¤erentiation, when two variants are marketed at the same
price, then all consumers prefer the same one (the high-quality variant): they all agree on the goods
ranking along the quality ladder. However, if a product is better than the alternative according
to one characteristic but worse than it according to another feature, then the dening property
of vertical di¤erentiation can cease to hold. In this case, it may occur that, at the same price,
some consumers buy a good, and some others buy the other one: there exists heterogeneity among
consumers in the products ranking. Since in our approach products are di¤erentiated along two
di¤erent dimensions, we deal with both vertical and horizontal di¤erentiation. Competition between
rms is described by a model of vertical di¤erentiation as long as all consumers agree that the good
performance of a product values more than its green nature (or the reverse!). A model of horizontal
di¤erentiation is instead evoked as soon as non-unanimity among consumers arises. Interestingly,
in our approach, the traditional result of horizontal di¤erentiation that states that symmetric rms
quote an equal price for their products at equilibrium can never be observed. The asymmetry
between rms stemming from the two dimensions of di¤erentiation is such that, when the dening
property of vertical di¤erentiation stops holding, the horizontal di¤erentiation does not apply sensu
stricto. Rather, competition falls into a hybrid category where at equal prices both variants have a
positive demand (horizontal di¤erentiation) but at equilibrium their prices do not coincide (vertical
di¤erentiation).7
More precisely, in this hybrid category of product di¤erentiation, rst we observe that when
both rms are active at equilibrium, in some circumstances the price of the green good (the low
hedonic quality product) ceases to be lower than the price of the competing variant (we label this
the price switch e¤ect). Of course, this result cannot be reconciled with that emerging in vertical
di¤erentiation where the high quality good is always sold at a higher price than the low quality
variant. Second, we nd that a market-monopolization e¤ect takes place whenever the intensity of
relative preferences is su¢ ciently high; only the green rm can stay active in the market, the "dirty"
competitor being pushed o¤ the market. A monopoly conguration can be observed in a vertically
di¤erentiated setting only under a restrictive assumption on the heterogeneity of the consumers in
the market which leads to the so called natural monopoly. Third, at this monopoly equilibrium
conguration, for extremely high intensity of relative preferences, the green monopolist extends the
market coverage farther than what is typically observed in a vertically di¤erentiated setting, thereby
7There is strand of literature combining horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation. See among others, Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1986), Neven and Thisse (1990), and more recently Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012).
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inducing a market-coverage e¤ect.
Finally, we develop some policy considerations. Although the set of policy tools for emissions
abatement is rather wide, some researchers and policy-makers share the view that a price on carbon
could be one of the most e¢ cient means of reducing the emissions. Also, a recent trend among rms
is the voluntary and responsible reduction of emissions that is gradually spreading worldwide with
an increasing involvement of well-known Multinational Enterprises (MNEs).
Although these two approaches do not share the same rationale (a carbon tax imposing a penalty
on polluting rms, the voluntary programs being based on a free participation), a common trait is
that rms can escape from abatement e¤ort, if it is relatively too costly. Whenever a carbon tax
is unilaterally set by a virtuous country, rms in the country can choose to relocate abroad, if this
is more protable than abating emissions. An immediate consequence of this is the emergence of
the so called pollution havens, which have ambiguous e¤ect on the global environmental damage.
As for the voluntary programs, since they are not imposed by law, it is not yet clear among policy-
makers whether they can somehow induce more and more rms to abate emissions with signicant
e¤ects on the pollution damage. Incidentally, the idea that rms can refrain from investing in green
productions if this investment is too costly is at the basis of the cap-and trade-system. Under this
system, emission limits are set on rms. The limit or cap is allocated and/or sold by a central
authority to rms in the form of emissions permits. These permits enables rms to emit a specic
volume of the specied pollutant. Then, rms can either use carbon o¤sets to meet standards or
trade emissions credits thereby escaping the e¤ort to abate emissions.
In this paper, we consider whether a relevant e¤ect on the environmental damage can be obtained
when only one rm undertakes an abatement e¤ort. In line with a recent strand of literature stating
that there exists a trade-o¤ between economic performance and environmental quality (Boucekkine
et al., 2011, 2013), in our model the abatement e¤ort improves the environmental quality of the good
at the expenses of the corresponding hedonic quality. Since complying with stricter environmental
norms is costly, when a rm invests in cleaner technology, it sacries at least in a short-run perspective
its own economic performance.8 For example, Wagner et al. (2002) found a negative relationship
between economic performance and a composite environmental indicator over the period 1995-1997.9
Interestingly, we nd that when only the brown producer improves its environmental quality, the
total damage can increase. This surprising result can be explained when taking into account that
changing the quality of a good modies its corresponding market share and possibly that of the rival.
The e¤ect, already known and labelled by the literature on trade and environment, composition e¤ect
8Admittedly, some argue that there is no way to o¤set this trade-o¤ regardless of the time horizon (Luken et al.
1996), while others suggest that in the long-run, getting better technologies in all respects (both environmental and
hedonic dimensions) is feasible (Boucekkine et al., 2011).
9The economic performance has been measured by the return to capital employed. The environmental indicator
has been dened taking into account emissions of SO2 and NOx, and chemical demand for oxygen in German, Italian,
Dutch and British industries.
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is mitigated or rather intensied by the existence of social preferences. These preferences can shape it
in such a way that an e¤ort for pollution abatement by the brown rm can have the undesirable e¤ect
to raise the pollution emitted by the industry as a whole! Rather, when green rms improve their
environmental quality, the damage in the industry can decrease even if the pollution coming from
the brown producer increases. We show how these e¤ects are related to the equilibrium structure
emerging in the market. It is worth noting that these ndings support the view that pollution is a
global issue and as a such it requires multilateral agreements among countries. If unilateral policies
enable rms to escape from emissions abatement (through relocation or trade of permits, inter alia),
then one could observe a raise in global pollution as a consequence of an asymmetric e¤ort among
rms.
Related Literature
Throughout the course of the last decade, increasing attention has been devoted to the impact of
environmental awareness on market equilibrium (Conrad, 2005; Eriksson, 2004; García-Gallego and
Georgantzís, 2009; Moraga-Gonzalez and Padro-Fumero, 2002; Nyborg et al., 2006; Rodriguez-Ibeas,
2007; Ben Elhadj and Tarola, 2015, inter alia). However, to the best of our knowledge, we are the
rst to combine in a unied setting of vertical di¤erentiation the notion of relative preferences and
the possibility of a conict between traditional hedonic qualities and newly established environmental
qualities. In this perspective, we complement the paper by Conrad (2005) and that by Ben Elhadj
and Tarola (2015). The former considers the trade-o¤ between the utility derived from the preferred
characteristics of a product and the moral behavior of buying "green" in a horizontal di¤erentiation
setting. The latter is based instead on a vertically di¤erentiated setting where relative preferences
are explicitly taken into account, as people seek a relative position among peers and buy products
also for their social value.
More specically, Conrad (2005) analyzes a two stage game where rms dene the environmental
characteristic of the products at the rst stage, thereby competing in price at the second stage.10
We share the view that environmental concern can modify traditional consumerspreferences and,
accordingly, it must be incorporated directly into the utility function. Nevertheless, we depart from
his model as our analysis is conceived in a setting dealing a priori with both vertical and horizontal
di¤erentiation, and we embrace the view that the environmental quality is perceived as a positive
characteristic of the product, and consumers may be willing to pay a higher price for a green good
(Farhar and Houston, 1996; Wasik, 1996; Lombardini-Riipinen, 2005; García-Gallego and Geor-
gantzís, 2009). Finally, far from Conrad (2005), we assume that both the social benet and the
10Coad et al. (2009) consider the processes of adoption of pro-environmental innovations by individual consumers.
They point out that, since environmental protection is a public good, not all agents can be willing to preserve environ-
ment. In this view, they consider whether the Government policy may intervene in order to sustain the adoption of
green innovations such as environmentally-friendly cars. Although they are mainly concerned with the notion of public
good, their discussion on intrinsic motivation and environmental morale provides useful insights to our analysis.
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social stigma attached to buyers increase with the environmental quality gap between variants.11
Ben Elhadj and Tarola (2015) introduce relative preferences in a model of vertical di¤erentiation,
and we follow such an approach. As in their paper, we also consider that the relative position of a
consumer in the social ladder depends on the relative position of the product variant that she buys
along the quality ladder. Nevertheless, they limit their attention to the case in which a variant is
simultaneously of higher hedonic quality and more environmentally friendly than the alternative.
Accordingly, it never arises a conict for the consumer between the pure performance of a product
and the social image that can be associated to its consumption. We complement their analysis by
introducing such a conict into the utility function.12
Our paper is nally linked to a signicant stream of the behavioral economics literature studying
pro-environmental behaviors (for a detailed review, see Turaga et al., 2010). This literature aims
at explaining the discrepancy between the predictions of the economic models based on the homo
economicus assumption and the empirical evidence on the voluntary contribution to public goods.
Drawing insights from social psychology, the idea is to extend the standard models incorporating
the incentive coming from moral/social motivation. Besides the important works by Andreoni (1988,
1990), there are many recent theoretical as well as empirical contributions in the ecological economics
literature (see among others, Brekke et al., 2003; Nyborg et al., 2006; Manner and Gowdy, 2010; Ek
and Soderholm, 2008; Owen and Videral, 2006). While we take inspiration from this literature, we
depart from it as we do not endogenise the moral/social incentive to pro-environmental behaviors,
we rather study how it a¤ects market competition (and in turn the environmental damage) in the
presence of product di¤erentiation.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we set up the model. In Section 3 we
develop the equilibrium analysis. In Section 4 we develop some environmental policy considerations.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a vertically di¤erentiated market with two variants of the same good. Similarly to the
models of vertical di¤erentiation (Mussa and Rosen, 1978), we state that the performance of the
variant i, with i = L;H, determines its intrinsic or hedonic quality qi. Accordingly, qH > qL: variant
H has a higher intrinsic quality than variant L so that qH is ranked higher along the hedonic quality
ladder. Nevertheless, variant qi generates polluting emissions per unit of production at some level
ei = qi. Accordingly, variant qH represents the brown good. Conversely, variant L is considered as
11 In Section 2, we will discuss at length how our utility function di¤ers from that modeled by Conrad (2005).
12Notice also that, whenever a vertically di¤erentiated setting is used to analyze an environmental problem, it is
generally assumed that otherwise identical products di¤er in their emissions so that the environmental quality represents
the only source of di¤erentiation (Moraga-Gonzales and Fumero 2002, Lombardini-Riipinen 2005, and García-Gallego
and Georgantzís 2009). Accordingly, our analysis also complements this strand of literature.
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green because its emissions eL are lower than those deriving from variant qH , namely eL = qL < eH .
The environmental quality of L is then higher than that of H. The ranking between qH and qL is
reversed when considered in terms of this latter dimension of quality: variant qL is ranked higher
than variant qH along the environmental quality ladder.13
There is a continuum of consumers indexed by  and uniformly distributed in the interval [0; b]
with density 1b . Keeping the traditional interpretation from vertical di¤erentiation models, parameter
 is proportional to the willingness to pay (henceforth WTP) for intrinsic quality, so that b denotes
the maximal WTP for the performance of a product among consumers.14 Formally, the indirect
utility of consumer type  writes as:
U () =
8<:
qH   pH    (eH   eL) , if she buys the high quality good,
qL   pL +  (eH   eL) , if she buys the low quality good,
0, if she refrains from buying.
We add to the traditional component of the indirect utility function (qi   pi) a further ingredient,
namely  (eH   eL) with i 6= j, such that the satisfaction of buying a product variant can be either
amplied or decreased by the environmental characteristics of variant i as compared with j. It is
worth noting that, it is not the level of emissions per se to determine the utility of consuming a
variant. Rather, as both the green and the brown variant are intended as positional goods, it is
the relative pollution coming from them - captured by the term j (eH   eL)j - to a¤ect consumers
utility.15 Parameter   0 measures the intensity of the relative dimension of consumption;16 the
higher the value of , the stronger the relative (or social) preferences with respect to the hedonic
ones.17 For the sake of simplicity and without any loss of generality, we can assume that  = 1, so
that (eH   eL) = (qH   qL).18
From the above formulation of the utility function, the consumer that is indi¤erent between
buying the low quality good and not buying at all is:
L =  +
pL   qH
qL
=
pL   (qH   qL)
qL
: (1)
with L > 0 () pL > (qH   qL). The consumer that is indi¤erent between buying the low quality
good and the high quality good is:
H = 2 +
pH   pL
qH   qL : (2)
13 It is worth noting that, from a social welfare viewpoint, the relative environmental quality of a variant does not
play any role, being rather the absolute level of emissions, eL and eH , the reference point of a social planner.
14Under this assumption on density, the population of consumers is always constant. See Garcia-Gallego and Geor-
gantzis (2009).
15See Ben Elhadi et al. (2014) for an indepth discussion of this formalization.
16 In our work, we use the terms social and relative as synonymous given that they both indicate that consumption
has a social dimension. Likewise, the resulting satisfaction also depends on the characteristics of society.
17The extreme case  = 0 reduces the model to the traditional vertical di¤erentiation framework with hedonic
preferences as unique drivers for consumption.
18We could consider a generic  > 0 without normalizing  to 1. However, this would not bring any further insight
to the model while making the analysis by far more cumbersome.
8
Thus, we immediately write the demand function faced by rm i, xi:
xH =
1
b
(b  H) = 1
b

b 

2 +
pH   pL
qH   qL

xL =
1
b
(H  maxfL; 0g) =
8>><>>:
1
b

pHqL   qHpL
qL (qH   qL) +
 (qH + qL)
qL

if pL > (qH   qL);
1
b

2 +
pH   pL
qH   qL

if pL  (qH   qL):
:
Note that as soon as L is not positive, the market is covered, that is also consumer type  = 0 is
willing to buy.
It is easy to see that the dening property of vertical di¤erentiation can cease to hold in this
setting. In particular, when qH and qL are sold at the same price, the demand function faced by
rms H and L, respectively write as:
xH (pH = pL) =
1
b
(b  2)
xL (pH = pL) =
8><>:
1
b

 (qH + qL)  pL
qL

if pL > (qH   qL);
2
b
if pL  (qH   qL):
Notice that:
xH (pH = pL) > 0 ()  < b
2
 H :
xL (pH = pL) > 0 ()
8<:  >
pL
qH + qL
 L(pL) if pL > (qH   qL)
8  > 0 if pL  (qH   qL) ()   pL
qH   qL
;
with
pL
qH   qL > 
L(pL). Thus, the market can be properly dened as a vertical di¤erentiated
market for extreme values of : namely, either   minfL(pL); Hg or   maxfL(pL); Hg.
In the former case the environmental awareness is not very signicant and no consumer would be
willing to buy the green good if its price is equal to that of the brown alternative: the performance
of a product dening its hedonic quality dominates the environmental impact which rather describes
its environmental quality and we are in the case of hedonic vertical di¤erentiation. In the latter
case, on the contrary, the consumers involvement in environmental protection is so strong that
nobody would buy the brown good, in spite of its better performance if the prices coincide: the
importance of the hedonic dimension of quality is dominated by the environmental dimension of
quality and we observe environmental vertical di¤erentiation. Finally, for intermediate values of ,
namely  2  minfL(pL); Hg;maxfL(pL); Hg both rms could get a positive market share at
the same price so that the approach of horizontal di¤erentiation turns out to be the proper way to
describe the competition between rms. In particular, both rms get a positive market share for
b  bD(pL) with
bD(pL)  2pL
(qH + qL)
: (3)
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In other words, when b 2 (0; bD(pL)), in  2 (H ; L(pL)) neither rm has a positive demand in the
market when they charge the same price, while in b  bD we have that  2 (L(pL); H) and both
players are active in the market.
We can summarize the above ndings in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 For extreme values of , namely either   minfL(pL); Hg or   maxfL(pL); Hg,
the dening property of vertical di¤erentiation holds. In the former (resp. the latter) case, the hedonic
quality dimension (resp. the environmental quality dimension) is the main driver to consumption.
We assume that prot functions of rms H and L write, respectively as:
H = xH  pH ; (4)
L = (pL   c)xL: (5)
where c > 0 is the cost per unit of green production. In the above formulation, it is implicitly
stated that production costs for rms only come from producing an environmentally friendly good.
Otherwise, one could imagine that there exists a cost function ci = hi + Ei where hi denotes the
hedonic-quality specic cost borne by rm i, with hH > hL and Ei the environmental quality specic
cost, with EH < EL.19 Since it is reasonable that hH > hL always holds, the only way to get
cH < cL is to assume that (EL   EH) > (hH   hL). Without any loss of generality, we can write
cL > cH = 0.20
We will show in the following analysis that di¤erent market equilibrium congurations may arise,
depending on the parametersvalues. In order to solve the model, we compute the price equilibrium
candidates corresponding to each market conguration and provide the parameter intervals for which
they yield the corresponding market outcomes.21 Without loss of generality, in the text we conne
the analysis to the case where the quality gap is such that qH=qL 2 (1; 2) and we provide in the
Appendix the complementary analysis where qH=qL  2. We will show there that our qualitative
ndings are robust to this extension.
3 The equilibrium analysis
Typically, in a vertically di¤erentiated setting, in absence of production costs, there is always room
for two rms if the market is not a natural duopoly.22 Furthermore, when the lowest WTP in the
19The case when cH > cL has been largely treated in the literature on vertical di¤erentiation (Cremer and Thisse
1994). Thus, we can disregard it.
20One may wonder why we do not introduce some xed costs to capture the role of green technologies in production.
Admittedly, when the quality is mainly related to investments in new technologies or in R&D, the assumption of xed
quality-specic costs can be reasonable. Nevertheless, a xed cost does not a¤ect the price game as it does not alter
rmsbest reply functions.
21This is standard in models of vertical di¤erentation. See Wauthy (1996) for more details.
22The upper bound to the number of rms which can coexist at equilibrium with positive market share and positive
equilibrium prices has nothing to do with costs and only depends on pattern of tastes and willingness to pay distribution.
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market is equal to zero, rms never nd it protable to cover the market. Accordingly, the starting
point of our analysis is that both rms are active and the market is uncovered. Therefore, demands
are dened as xL = 1b (H   L) and xH = 1b (b  H). Prot functions for rm H and rm L are
given by:
H = xH  pH , (6)
L = (pL   c)xL, (7)
and the pair of candidate equilibrium prices can be easily obtained:
pL =
2cqH + (qH   qL) (2qH + bqL)
4qH   qL , (8)
pH =
cqH + (qH   qL) [2bqH   (3qH   qL)]
4qH   qL . (9)
Formally, for this candidate to be an equilibrium, we need to verify that both prices are positive and
that pL is higher than the marginal cost, namely pL > c and p

H > 0:
pL  c ()  
c (2qH   qL) + bqL (qL   qH)
2qH(qH   qL)  ; (10)
pH  0 ()  
qH [2b(qH   qL) + c]
(qL   3qH) (qL   qH)  ; (11)
with
 > 0 () b < b0  c (2qH   qL)
qL (qH   qL) ; (12)
 >  () b > b  c
(qH + qL)
; (13)
and b0 > b. Moreover, we have to demonstrate that the market is uncovered, and that both goods
have positive demands, i.e. 0 < L < H < b. Then, by plugging (8) and (9) into (1) and (2), we
obtain:
H  b ()   , L  H ()   ;
L  0 ()   b  2cqH + b (qH   qL) qL(2qH   qL) (qH   qL) , (14)
where the precise values of L and 

H are reported in the Appendix (see proof of Lemma 1). Moreover:
b >  () b < bb  cqH
(qH   qL)2
.
One can already notice that there are situations where an interior duopoly solution with uncovered
market cannot be sustained at equilibrium. For example, when  > , H > b (and pH < 0), then
In particular, given a population of consumers, identied by the parameter  2 [; ] ; 0   <  the upper bound to
the number of rms is 2 so that the market is a natural duopoly i¤ 

2  1
4
; 1
2

:
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rm H can not be active at the duopoly equilibrium. Moreover, in the parametric region where b > bb
and  > b, L < 0 then the market is covered.
The following lemmas identify the market congurations that emerge for each combination of b
and , the crucial parameters of our model. We conne in the Appendix the mathematical proofs.
Lemma 1 species the conditions for the duopoly equilibrium to hold:
Lemma 1 Provided b > b, both rms are active in the market when  2 [maxf0; g;maxf; bg).
The duopoly is sustained by an interior equilibrium for  2 [maxf0; g;minf; bg), while it is
sustained by a corner equilibrium with the market covered for  2 [b; b). The latter possibility
only occurs when b  bb:
Proof. See Appendix.
It follows that, when b is su¢ ciently high and  is not excessive, a duopoly emerges at the
equilibrium. When this happens, two additional results are worth the attention. First, by comparing
equilibrium prices in the duopoly scenarios, we nd that:
Remark 1 When the market is characterized by a duopoly, the equilibrium price of the green variant
can be higher than that of the brown variant. In particular, this always holds when the duopoly
is covered at the limit, and in  2 (e,minf; bg) when the duopoly is uncovered, given that
pL > p

H ()  >
b(2q2H   3qHqL + q2L)  cqH
(qH   qL) (5qH   qL)  e:
Proof. See Appendix.
Second, by recalling Proposition 1, we nd that:
Remark 2 For intermediate values of  the duopoly equilibrium is characterized by horizontal
di¤erentiation and both rms get a positive market share when selling at the same price. For
relatively high (low) values of ; environmental (hedonic) vertical di¤erentiation prevails.
Proof. See Appendix.
By combining the results of Lemma 1 and Remarks 1-2, one realizes how the duopoly equilibrium is
crucially a¤ected by social preferences. For relatively low levels of , hedonic vertical di¤erentiation
characterizes the market interaction between the brown and the green producer. Consumers are
mainly interested in the intrinsic quality of the product rather than its environmental impact, and
the brown rm can charge a higher price than its green rival. For intermediate values of , horizontal
di¤erentiation prevails and both producers obtain a positive market share even when charging the
same price. Within this parametric region a price switch occurs for  > e, meaning that the
green producer obtains a price premium since environmental savvy consumers highly value the green
dimension of quality. Such a price gain is more pronounced when  further increases. Moreover,
as we enter the interval region  > H , environmental vertical di¤erentiation properly describes
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market competition, as we know from Proposition 1. In the last region compatible with a duopoly
equilibrium, i.e.  2 [b; b), not only the green producer enjoys the price premium, but it also covers
the market at the limit.
In order to complete the characterization of the market equilibria, we next move to consider the
possibility for either rm to monopolize the market. Our results are gathered in Lemmas 2 and 3.
Lemma 2 For each level of b, the green rm monopolizes the market for  > maxfM ; ; bg, where
M  c  bqL
qH   qL : The green monopoly market is covered for   
M  c+ bqL
qH   qL , otherwise it
remains uncovered.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 3 The brown rm monopolizes the market in the range of parameters such that b 2 [0; b0)
and  < minf; Mg, where M  bqH
(qH   qL) :
Proof. See Appendix.
Finally, we can identify a relatively small interval region where neither the brown nor the green
producer is active on the market. In particular,
Lemma 4 There is no active rm at the market equilibrium when b 2 [0; b) and  2 (M ; M ):
Proof. See Appendix.
While the results of Lemma 4 complete our equilibrium analysis, our focus is on the interval
regions where at least one rm is active. The following Proposition summarizes the main ndings of
Lemmata (1-3):
Proposition 2 Depending on the interplay between b and , we can characterize two relevant in-
terval regions:
(i) For relatively low values of b (b 2 (b;bb)), both rms are active at the interior equilibrium when 
takes intermediate values, while the market is monopolized by the green (resp. brown) producer
for  su¢ ciently high (resp. low). At the green monopoly equilibrium, the green producer nds
it protable to cover the whole market when  is extremely relevant.
(ii) When b is relatively high (b  bb), the brown producer never monopolizes the market. Further,
under duopoly the green rm can optimally cover the market. This happens for relatively
high values of : Finally, it becomes increasingly di¢ cult for the green rm to monopolize the
market.
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Proof. It directly follows from combining the proofs of Lemmata 1-3.
Figure 1 represents all the di¤erent market congurations which emerge at equilibrium, together
with the price switch discussed in Remark 1.23 As we restricted our attention to the case qH=qL 2
[1; 2), Figure 1 was plotted by xing qH = 1:5 and qL = 1, together with c = 1. This is without loss
of generality. We consider in the Appendix the case where qH=qL  2:
Figure 1: qH=qL 2 (1; 2)
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It is worth noting that, compared with the traditional setting of vertical di¤erentiation, the
equilibrium congurations are a¤ected here not only by conventional parameter b; which measures
the willingness to pay for the hedonic quality, but also by parameter , which captures the additional
social component of consumption. The existence of social preferences represents a benet for the
green rm, and its intensity determines which market conguration prevails for each given value of
b.
Consider su¢ ciently high values of b (b > b) and  ( > ) and focus on Lemmas 1 and 2,
combined with Remarks 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows that the duopoly holds at equilibrium when
 2 [maxf0; g;maxf; bg); as from Lemma 1: Indeed, it shows the interval region where the price
switch e¤ect takes place ( > e, as from Remark 1) and the green rm can quote a price higher than
the brown rival, its variant being perceived above than the other one along the quality ladder. In
this case, the environmental dimension of quality is more valuable than the hedonic counterpart, and
we can even have a region characterized by environmental vertical di¤erentiation (Remark 2).
Another interesting feature of our model is related to the fact that both the price of the green
23The issue of vertical vs. horizontal di¤erentiation reported in Remark 2, while being useful in interpreting our
results, does not add much in terms of graphical representation.
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variant and the corresponding market share at equilibrium increase with , whatever the equilibrium
market conguration.24 Accordingly, there is no trade-o¤ between the price switch e¤ect and the
market share enjoyed by the green rm. For su¢ ciently high values of , in fact, the brown rm is
forced to exit the market. This is represented in Figure 1 in the region  > maxfM ; ; bg, where a
green monopolization e¤ect enters the scene, as we know from Lemma 2. Finally, for extremely high
values of  (  M ), a positive market coverage e¤ect appears, with the green producer selling its
variant to the whole set of consumers.
Notice that these e¤ects are always mitigated by the parameter b, whose intensity favours the
brown producers as it indicates that consumers are willing to pay more for the hedonic dimension of
quality. This is evident in Figure 1, where, the higher b, the higher the    value required for the
above e¤ects to emerge. As a conclusive point, we can state:
Corollary 1 Ceteris paribus, both the price switch e¤ect and the green monopolization e¤ect are
more likely to occur for relatively low values of b.
Proof. It is relatively easy to show that all the relevant threshold values of  are increasing in b.
This, combined with the proofs of Lemmata 1-3, completes the demonstration.
Finally, the above results can be applied to each specication of the quality ratio qH=qL: The
equilibrium analysis reported in this section assumes a quality gap such that qH=qL 2 (1; 2). In
the Appendix we show that the same qualitative results hold for qH=qL  2. Namely, although the
interval region dened by the relevant threshold values of  change in dimension, at equilibrium we
get the same market congurations as in Proposition 2. Figure 2 represents the case qH=qL  2. The
unique di¤erence with respect with Figure 1 is that qH = 2:8:
24 Indeed, the positive e¤ect of  on the equilibrium price and market share is observed under both duopoly and
monopoly.
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Figure 2: qH=qL  2
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A comparison between Figure 1 and Figure 2 enables us to evaluate the consequences of increasing
the quality gap between the two variants. Two forces are pushing towards opposite directions given
that consumers value the environmental performance of the product and not only its intrinsic quality.
On the one hand, as qH=qL increases, consumers tend to value more the intrinsic quality di¤erence,
thus rewarding the high quality-brown producer. On the other hand, the higher hedonic quality gap,
which corresponds to a higher environmental quality gap, raises the social component of consumption
thus contributing to favour the low quality-green producer. It is again the interaction between  and
b that determines which of these two forces prevails. When  is relatively high, notice in Figure 2
that the area where the market is covered, both for the green monopoly and for the duopoly, tend
to increase. Ceteribus paribus, an increase in the quality gap is reected here in a higher level of
e¤ectiveness of relative preferences. On the contrary, for relatively low levels of , it is the intrinsic
quality that dominates the environmental e¤ects, and an increase in qH=qL tends to favour the brown
producer. One can notice, for example, that the area where the price switch does not occur is larger
in Figure 2.25
4 Some environmental policy implications
We evaluate the e¤ect on the environmental damage when one rm is induced to improve its environ-
mental quality, either by a policy, whatever it is, or by a voluntary program for emissions abatement.26
25An increase in qH=qL implies an upward shift of e, as it can be easily demonstrated.
26We focus on changes of the environmental damage due to changes of rmsenvironmental qualities. We depart from
the literature on environmental policy instruments looking at total social welfare that typically focuses on taxation
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Consistently with a large bulk of literature, when improving the environmental quality, the rm sac-
ries the corresponding performance of the good. This trade-o¤ between economic performance and
environmental quality is viewed as a key feature of the environmental policy: since both governments
at international level and consumers at local level call for cleaner technologies, rms are faced with
the urgency to comply with stricter environmental norms.27 Nevertheless, their abatement e¤orts at
least in the short run penalize the economic performance. In our model, environmental quality and
hedonic quality go along opposite directions so that the above evoked trade-o¤ immediately emerges.
The total environmental damage deriving from global emissions (D) is dened as the sum of the
environmental damage coming from the green rm DL = qLxL, and that coming from the brown
rival DH = qHxH , where we remind that the hedonic qualities reect the per-unit emissions of the
goods, i.e. qL = eL and qH = eH .28 Formally, we analyse what happens when either rm improves
its environmental quality given the environmental quality of the rival. The main ndings can be
explained by tracking down some typical e¤ects that, borrowing from the literature on trade and
environment, we can label technique e¤ect and composition e¤ect. The former e¤ect indicates the
reduction of damage deriving from adoption of green technologies, with a lowering in emissions for unit
of output. The latter refers to the change of market share that each rm undergoes as a consequence
of the di¤erent quality gap between variants.29 In our model, the composition e¤ect is moved by
two drivers: a price competition driver and a social component of consumption driver. Changing
the environmental quality of a variant a¤ects the quality gap and thus the price competition taking
place in the market. For example, increasing the environmental quality of the brown good reduces
the quality gap, thereby making the price competition between rms ercer. As a consequence of
this, the brown rm expands its market share and steals consumers from the rival with an immediate
increase in the corresponding damage. On the contrary, increasing the environmental quality of the
green rm magnies the hedonic quality gap between goods thereby softening the price competition
in the market. In this case, the market share of the brown rm tends to decrease thus reducing the
and subsidies (see for instance Moraga-Gonzales and Padron-Fumero (2002), Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) and Deltas
et al. (2013)). There is however a recent stream of literature supporting environmental/informative campaigns as a
policy instrument to supplement and/or substitute traditional policies. See among others Sartzetakis et al. (2012) and
Mantovani and Vergari (2013). See also Lambertini (2013) for a comprehensive analysis.
27The role of consumers in enhancing investment in cleaner technology has been recently recognized by the institutions.
See the Energy Union Package (2015) on this.
28The environmental damage is usually taken to be quadratic in the level of emissions. Our assumption of a linear
environmental damage allows us to simplify calculations and obtain analytically tractable expressions. However, the
qualitative results of our paper do not change if we consider alternative specications, even if that would imply resorting
to tedious numerical simulations. See Lambertini 2013 for this assumption of linear damage.
29Typically, in the trade and the environment literature (see e.g. Copeland and Taylor, 1994, 2003), it is usual
to distinguish three e¤ects of trade liberalisation on the environment, following Grossman and Krueger (1993). The
scale e¤ect captures the impact on the level of economic activity, with the composition of total production unchanged.
The composition e¤ect indicates the change in the sectoral composition of production due to the impact of trade
liberalisation on the country specialization. The technique e¤ect reects that trade liberalisation may lead to a change
in the technologies adopted, with a lowering in emissions for unit of output.
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corresponding damage, whereas the market share of the green rm can decrease.
From the equilibrium analysis, we know that di¤erent equilibrium congurations can emerge.
Accordingly, we analyse the environmental properties of each equilibrium in turn.
We consider rst the case of uncovered duopoly. We remind that, it takes place whenever the
social component of consumption takes intermediate values (namely  2  maxf0; g;minf; bg).
The environmental damage is:
DD = D
L
D +D
H
D = qH
b (2qH + qL) +  (qL   qH)  c
(4qH   qL) :
Let us assume that the brown rm decides to reduce its per-unit emissions, while the green rm
refrains from changing its quality variant. We keep the assumption that the brown rm always stays
more pollutant than the green rival (namely eH > eL).
Proposition 3 Consider the uncovered duopoly equilibrium. Increasing the environmental quality
of the brown variant does not always reduce the environmental damage. Indeed, when the social
component of consumption is su¢ ciently high, the damage coming from the green rm decreases with
the environmental quality of the brown good. Still, the damage from the brown rm increases to
such an extent to neutralize this reduction whenever the WTP for hedonic quality is low. In this
circumstance, total damage increases with the environmental quality of the brown good.
Proof. See Appendix.
For an intuition of the results stated in the above Proposition, notice that a reduction of qH
raises the equilibrium market share of the brown rm (as a lower quality calls for a lower price and in
turn a higher quantity) while decreasing that of the green producer (the consumption coming from
the moral motivation is increasing in the environmental quality gap) when the social component of
consumption is rather high. In this case, the composition e¤ect occurs with the brown rm stealing
consumers from the green rival. Thus, the e¤ect on the damage coming from the green rm is clear-
cut: it decreases as a result of improving the environmental quality of the brown good. As for the
e¤ect on the damage coming from the brown rm, this is ambiguous. On one hand, a direct e¤ect
is that the per-unit emissions decrease; but on the other hand the indirect e¤ect of reducing qH is
that the market share of the brown rm increases. The rst e¤ect is independent of  and b. The
second e¤ect instead increases with the social component of consumption  and decreases with the
WTP b: the higher is , and / or the lower is b, the more signicant is the impact of the quality gap
reduction on the consumption decisions. As a result, as long as  is low relative to b, the direct e¤ect
of reducing qH prevails, so that DHD decreases; for  relatively high, in contrast, it is the indirect
e¤ect to prevail so that DHD increases.
Now, let us consider the alternative scenario where the green rm improves its environmental
quality, the brown rm refraining from emissions abatement.
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Proposition 4 Consider the uncovered duopoly equilibrium. Improving the environmental quality of
the green good reduces the damage coming from the brown rm to such an extent that even when the
own green rms damage increases, the total damage decreases.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Improving the environmental quality of the green variant has always a positive e¤ect on the
damage of the brown rival, since it decreases. Indeed, a lower qL widens the quality gap between
variants so that the price competition softens and ceteris paribus the equilibrium price of the brown
variant increases. As a consequence, the corresponding market share decreases like so the damage.
The green rm instead can get a larger market share if the social component of consumption is very
signicant. Nevertheless, the net e¤ect on total damage is clear-cut: it always decreases because
the increase in the damage coming from the green producer is overcompensated by the reduction in
damage deriving from the brown rm.
Consider next the covered duopoly. We remind that, it takes place whenever  2 (b; b), that
is a relevant interval as long as the WTP for hedonic quality is rather high (namely b > b^). The
environmental damage is:
DC = D
L
C +D
H
C =
1
b

qL
1
2
(b+ )

+

qH
1
2
(b  )

=
1
b

1
2
b (qH + qL)   1
2
(qH   qL)

:
Each component of damage (DLC and D
H
C ) decreases linearly with the environmental qualities qH
and qL. Interestingly, the composition e¤ect does not play any role because the market share of each
rm is independent of the rivals environmental quality. So, the damage coming from the producer
i; namely DiC increases with qi, while being independent of qj ; with i; j = H;L and i 6= j. Further,
the total damage decreases with , while being increasing in b. This is quite intuitive because under
market coverage, ceteris paribus, the higher the market share of the brown good (increasing in b and
decreasing in ), the lower the corresponding market share of the less pollutant rival. So, we can
state that:
Proposition 5 In the covered duopoly equilibrium, improving the environmental quality of a variant,
whatever it is, always reduces the environmental damage.
It follows from the above that whenever the price competition between rms is particularly erce
(which is typically the case under market coverage), improving the environmental quality of either
the brown or the green good entail the same qualitative e¤ect on damage.
Consider nally the case when the social component of consumption  is so high ( > maxfM ; ; bg)
that the market is monopolized by the green rm. However, the brown good (not sold at equilibrium)
remains a reference point for consumers. In the uncovered monopoly,  2 [maxfM ; ; bg; M ), the
environmental damage writes as
DM = qL
bqL   c+  (qH   qL)
2qL
=
1
b

1
2
(bqL   c+  (qH   qL))

:
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Whenever the green rm improves its environmental quality, we nd that
@DM
@qL
=

 1
2

b 1 (   b) < 0
as  > b always holds. Therefore, the abatement e¤ort by the green rm increases the damage as
its market share enlarges. Rather, when improving the environmental quality of the brown good the
environmental damage reduces unambiguously as:
@DM
@qH
=
1
2
b 1 > 0:
At rst sight, this nding can be counterintuitive: the brown rm plays a role in determining the
damage, while being inactive in the market. However notice that an abatement e¤ort could be
undertaken by the brown rm with the aim of re-entering the market. This surprising result can be
explained when taking into account that the market share of the green rm is a¤ected by the quality
produced by the brown rival: the more pollutant the brown good, the larger the market share of
the green producer and thus the higher the corresponding damage. This implies that an abatement
e¤ort by the brown rm dominates that coming from the green rm in terms of damage.
In the covered monopoly,  > M , the damage coincides with the per-unit emissions of the green
good, qL. In this case, the brown rm no longer plays a role in determining the damage since under
market coverage there is no room for entry.30
Proposition 6 Under monopoly, whenever the market is uncovered, improving the environmental
quality of the green (resp. brown) rm increases (resp. reduces) the total damage. When the market
in covered, the damage increases with the environmental quality of the green variant, the brown
producer ceasing to play a role.
Although we have developed a very stylized analysis, we nd that under duopoly, the abatement
coming from the green rm is preferred over that coming from the brown since the former unam-
biguously reduces damage, while the latter can cause an increase of it. However, the same statement
no longer holds when considering the monopoly case. Indeed, under monopoly, inducing the brown
rm to improve its environmental quality reduces the damage, which rather increases when an e¤ort
is undertaken by the green rm.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered a situation in which a "clean" and a "dirty" rm compete in the
market by o¤ering two di¤erentiated products that di¤erently satisfy a social norm. We have assumed
that there exist two sources of di¤erentiation: the performance of the good determines its hedonic
30 In a way, this result is reminiscent of the natural monopoly property.
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quality, while the polluting emissions set its environmental quality. Furthermore, the high (resp. low)
hedonic quality variant is less (resp. more) complying with the norm compared with the alternative.
Therefore, an environmentally friendly good satises the consumersdesire to stand out as a good
citizen, however leaving them unsatised due to poor performance. Our ndings can be summarized
as follows. First of all, our model departs from a traditional setting of vertical di¤erentiation,
belonging rather to a hybrid category of product di¤erentiation where goods can be either vertically
or horizontally di¤erentiated depending on the social component of consumption. As a result of this,
the traditional ranking of prices no longer holds and a price switch can emerge, with the price of
the low hedonic quality variant being higher than the alternative good. This price switch e¤ect can
emerge as a consequence of a quality switch so that all consumers would prefer the green good to
the brown alternative, if the variants would be sold at the same price. In this case, the mechanism
underlying the price switch directly ows from the vertical di¤erentiation approach, where the green
variant is intended as a high-quality variant. Otherwise, the price switch emerges in a setting where
only some consumers would prefer the green good to the brown product, if sold at the same price. In
this case, the switch can no longer be attributed to a vertical di¤erentiation mechanism: the dening
property of competition is here rather ascribable to the horizontal di¤erentiation.
Further, when the social component of consumption is strong; the market can be monopolized by
the green producer. It is worth noting that this monopolization e¤ect is never observed in a vertically
di¤erentiated market where the lower bound of the market is nil. Typically, in this situation there
is always room in the market for two rms, as a natural monopoly setting requires the market to be
covered. Furthermore, in a traditional vertically di¤erentiated framework, the coverage of the market
can never be observed due to the lower bound above evoked: when the lowest willingness to pay is
nil, no rm can nd it protable to cover the market at equilibrium as this choice would require to
set a nil price at equilibrium.
From the above considerations, it derives that the social dimension of consumption provides
the green producer with an incentive to specialize in green production: the green rm can benet
from a price premium or even monopolize the market for values of  su¢ ciently high. As a such,
these preferences represent a market-based mechanism for rms to produce green goods and escape
from the penalty deriving from the consumers attitude toward brown products. An immediate
consequence of this statement is that, contrary to what is somehow argued, consumers may have a
role in reducing pollution. Nesting the conict between the social component of consumption and
the individual-rationality-based motive in the traditional utility function enables to show how this
role can be carried out. Moreover, taking into account this consumersattitude toward green goods
sheds light on the e¤ectiveness of climate policy measures when they do not involve all rms in the
market. Under a trade-o¤ between hedonic quality and environmental quality, our analysis shows
that the e¤ect of reducing emissions on environmental damage is not clear-cut as it changes with the
21
rm undertaking emissionsabatement and the market structure arising at equilibrium.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
First, observe that the interval [maxf0; g;maxf; bg) is non-empty for b > b given that  >
0 () b < b0 with b0 > b,  >  () b > b and  > b () b < bb. Notice also that the interval
[b; b) is non-empty only for b > bb, given that b < b () b > bb. Secondly, following the previous
discussion, equilibrium candidates (8) and (9) verify pL > c, p

H > 0 and 0 < 

L < 

H < b only when
 2 [maxf0; g;minf; bg), where:
L =
2cqH   (qH   qL) [2qH   (b+ )qL]
(4qH   qL) qL ;
H =
(qH   qL) [(2b+ 3)qH   (b+ )qL]  cqH
(4qH   qL) (qH   qL) :
Indeed, for   b (which is possible only when b  bb), then L  0 and the market is covered.
However, an interior duopoly solution with covered market cannot be sustained at equilibrium. In
order to prove it, assume that the demand for the low quality good starts at zero. This means
that xL  H . Solving the corresponding f.o.c.s for the modied prot functions, the candidate
equilibrium prices are
p
0
H =
1
3
[c+ 2(b  ) (qH   qL)];
p
0
L =
1
3
[2c+ (b+ 2) (qH   qL)]:
Now we can substitute into (1) and (2) and check that 
0
L < 0 < 
0
H < b, together with p
0
H > 0;
p
0
L > c: Algebraic calculations reveal that:

0
L 
2c+ (b  ) (qH   qL)
3qL
< 0,  > 2c+ (b  ) (qH   qL)
3qL
;

0
H 
1
3
(b+ 2   c
qH   qL ) > 0,  < b+
c
2 (qH   qL) :
Nonetheless, the two conditions cannot be simultaneously satised given that
2c+ (b  ) (qH   qL)
3qL
> b+
c
2 (qH   qL) ;
as it can be easily ascertained. In such a case, therefore, a duopoly with the market covered at
the limit becomes the equilibrium candidate. This equilibrium conguration is characterized by
constrained price competition. As the market is covered at the limit, the indi¤erent consumer L
dened in (1) is set equal to zero, and demand functions are dened as xL = H and xH = b   H .
Accordingly, the equilibrium price of the green good is now given by:
pCL =  (qH   qL) ;
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and it always hold that pCL > c. Therefore, inserting such a value in the best reply of the high quality
rm and solving, we obtain:
pCH =
(b  ) (qH   qL)
2
:
The optimal price of the brown rm pCH is strictly positive i¤  < b. Hence, when   b, there is
still room for both producers and the market is covered at the limit only when  < b; as it can also
be observed from 0 = CL < 
C
H < b, where 
C
H = (b+ ) =2.
Proof of Remark 1
At the interior duopoly equilibrium we nd that:
pL T pH ()  T
b(2q2H   3qHqL + q2L)  cqH
(qH   qL) (5qH   qL)  e:
Moreover, it is straightforward to nd that e 2 (0;minf; bg) when qH=qL 2 (1; 2) : In such a case,
then, the price charge charge by the green producer is higher than that charged by the brown producer
when  2 (e, minf; bg). The opposite holds in  2 (0; e]:
Consider now the covered duopoly at the limit, which holds when  > b and b > bb. We easily
obtain that:
pCH > p
C
L ()  <
b
3
 e0:
However, it is immediate to nd that:
b   e0 = 2 [3cqH   b (qH   qL) (qH   2qL)]
3 (qH   qL) (2qH   qL) > 0
given that we are limiting our attention to the case where qH=qL 2 (1; 2). When the duopoly is
covered at the limit, we get that pCH < p
C
L :
Proof of Remark 2
First of all, we insert pL in bD(pL) and impose  = e to nd that:
H > L(pLj=e) () b  4cqH(qH + qL)(3qH + qL)  bD:
In such a case, moreover,
xL(p

H = p

L) > 0 ()  >
2cqH + b(qH   qL)qL
2q2H + 5qHqL   q2L
 LID;
where additional subscript ID stands for Internal Duopoly. It is immediate so show that b < bD < b0
and that H > LID when the duopoly is uncovered, i.e. in  2 [maxf0; g;minf; bg):
On the other hand, when the market is covered at the limit, xL(pCH = p
C
L ) > 0 ()  > 0 and
obviously no vertical hedonic di¤erentiation prevails when  is relatively high, i.e. in  2 [b; b).
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All in all, under the conditions sustaining a duopoly (both covered and uncovered), market
competition between the green and the brown producer can be described by either horizontal or
vertical di¤erentiation. In particular, when  2 [maxf0; g; LID), then hedonic vertical di¤erentia-
tion prevails, as the social component of consumption is very weak. For  2 [LID; H) horizontal
di¤erentiation prevails as both rms would obtain a positive market share even when charging the
same price. It is also possible to demonstrate that e 2 [LID; H), thus revealing that the price switch
occurs when products are perceived as horizontally di¤erentiated. Finally,  2 [H ;maxf; bg), the
duopoly equilibrium is characterized by environmental vertical di¤erentiation, given that consumers
attach a high value to the environmental performance of the product.
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof aims at demonstrating that, when  > maxfM ; ; bg; two conditions are simultane-
ously veried: (i) the brown rm is not active in the market, neither at the duopoly nor at the
monopoly equilibrium; (ii) the equilibrium price charged by the green rm when it holds a monopoly
position is higher than its marginal cost. First, notice that:
maxfM ; ; bg =
8><>:
M if b  b;
 if b 2

b;bb ;
b if b  bb:
Let us start from the brown rm. At the internal duopoly equilibrium, pH  0 ()   ,
as we know from (11). When  > , then pH < 0 and the brown rm would stop producing.
Consider now  2 (; ), which holds in b 2 [0; b]: Following (10), there exists the possibility for
brown producer to monopolize the market, given that pL < c. In such a case, its prot would be
MH = pH fb  [pH=qH +  (qH   qL) =qH ]g. We compute the equilibrium price pMH and nd that:
pMH =
bqH   (qH   qL)
2
> 0 ()  < bqH
(qH   qL)  
M :
However, M <  in b 2 [0; b]. This implies that pMH < 0 in  > . The brown monopoly is therefore
excluded from the market when  2 (; ). Finally, from the demonstration of Lemma 1, we know
that, when the market is a duopoly covered at the limit, then pCH  0 when   b. We need to
impose therefore  > b to remove the possibility for the brown producer to be present in the covered
duopoly at the limit. To sum up, parametric restrictions ensuring that the brown rm is not active
in the market boil down to  > maxf; bg:
As for the green producer, in absence of the brown rival it would obtain monopoly prot ML =
(pL   c) [bqL   pL +  (qH   qL)] =qL. The resulting equilibrium price is:
pML =
1
2
[c+  (qH   qL) + bqL]  c ()   c  bqL
qH   qL  
M :
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We have to introduce therefore the additional condition   M : As we notice above, maxfM ; ; bg =
M if b 2 [0; b]: Moreover, we have to verify that 0 < ML < b. We can easily nd that:
0 < ML 
c  qH + (b+ )qL
2qL
()  < c+ bqL
qH   qL  M ;
ML  b ()  
c  bqL
qH   qL  
M :
This veries that the market is characterized at equilibrium by the monopoly position held by the
green producer when  > maxfM ; ; bg. Moreover, at this green monopoly, the market is uncovered
if  < M , with M  maxfM ; ; bg, and covered when   M :
Proof of Lemma 3
Two conditions have to simultaneously hold when  < minf; Mg. First, the green rm can not
be active in the market. As we know from (10), pL < c when  < . Recall that such an interval
region is valid only when b 2 [0; b0), as it can be seen from (12). Second, the price charged by the
brown rm when it acts as a monopolist has to be positive. From the demonstration of Lemma 2,
we obtained that pMH > 0 when  < 
M . This always hold in b 2 (b; b0]; where it is immediate to
demonstrate that  < M . In b 2 [0; b], on the contrary, M < , and therefore in such an interval
region we have to impose the additional condition that  < M for the price charged by the brown
monopolist, pMH ; to be positive. To sum up, when b 2 [0; b0); the only rm in the market is the brown
one when  < minf; Mg:
Proof of Lemma 4
From Lemmata (1-3), we can identify an interval region where the unique candidate at equilibrium
is the absence of producers. From (13), we know that  <  when b 2 [0; b], thus complicating our
analysis. Consider rst  <  (< ). Firm L can not be active at the internal duopoly, given that,
from (10), pL < 0 when  < . The brown monopoly, however, can be sustained at equilibrium only
when pMH > 0()  < M , as we found in the proof of Lemma 2. Given that M <  in b 2 [0; b]; it
follows that no producer is active in  2 (M ; ): Consider now  2 [; ). In this region, both pL < c
and pH < 0: In the proof of Lemma 2, we demonstrated that a brown monopoly does not exist, as
 > M and therefore pMH < 0. However, neither the green monopoly can hold at equilibrium, as
pML  c only when   M > : A similar reasoning can be applied when   , where pH < 0 and
the green monopoly holds at equilibrium for   M > . To sum up, no rm is active in the market
when  2 (M ; M ):
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Equilibrium analysis for qH=qL  2:
From the equilibrium analysis performed in Section 3, we know that b >  () b < bb, e < 
and  >  () b > b. However, when qH=qL  2 and additional interval region takes place, given
that
b > e
8<: always when qH=qL 2 (1; 2)() b < eb  3cqH
(qH   2qL) (qH   qL) when qH=qL  2
:
The complete ranking is as follows:
1. b 2 (0;bb): e <  < b, where b will not be considered as the equilibrium will change when
  , given that the brown producer cannot charge a positive price in the market, as we
already know (see Lemma 2).
2. b  bb when qH=qL 2 (1; 2), and b 2 [bb;eb) when qH=qL  2 : e < b < , where  will not be
considered as we identied a covered market when   b (see Lemma 1).
3. qH=qL  2 and b  eb, where b < e < , and here both e and  will not make sense as they are
referred to an internal equilibrium which no longer holds when   b.
Figure A represents the aforementioned ranking; it has been plotted by xing c = 1 and qL = 1:
Figure A: Threshold Values of b
6
-
qH=qL
0
1 2
b
bb
eb
We focus on the region where qH=qL  2 and b  eb, as the remaining interval region has already
been analyzed in the main text. The relevant ranking is here b < e < . Two cases have to be
considered:
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1. In  < b we have an uncovered duopoly without price switch, given that now b < e:
2. When   b, then we have a covered duopoly in  2 [b; b) and a covered green monopoly when
  b: In this interval region, in fact, M < b; as it can be demonstrated by combining
M > b () b <
c
qH   2qL  b
M
with the fact that bM < eb. Hence, an uncovered green monopoly cannot be obtained at
equilibrium. As for the covered duopoly, we nd that the price switch occurs in  2 [e0; b);
given that:
(i) pCH > p
C
L ()  <
b
3
 e0;
(ii) e0 > b () b  eb:
In  2 [b; e0); we discover the existence of a covered duopoly at the limit without price switch.
Proof of Proposition 3
In the unconstrained equilibrium, the equilibrium environmental damage is:
DD = D
L
D +D
H
D =
(2bqH   c+ bqL   qH + qL) qH
(4qH   qL) , with
DLD = qL
 
cqL   2cqH + bqHqL   2qHqL   bq2L + 2q2H

qH
b (qL   qH) (qL   4qH) qL , and
DHD = qH
 
2bqHqL   cqH   4qHqL   2bq2H + 3q2H + q2L

b (qH   qL) (qL   4qH) :
We proceed by studying the sign of the partial derivatives with respect to qH .
@DLD
@qH
=
@qL
@qH
xL +
@xL
@qH
qL
so that the sign of
@DLD
@qH
coincides with the sign of
@xL
@qH
, given that
@qL
@qH
xL = 0. Then,
@xL
@qH
=
qL
h
c
 
6q2H   4qHqL + q2L
  bqL (qH   qL)2i+ 4qH (2qH   qL) (qH   qL)2
(qH   qL)2 (4qH   qL)2 qL
> 0
()  > L
with L 
bq2L (qL   qH)2   qLc
 
6q2H   4qHqL + q2L

4qH (2qH   qL) (qL   qH)2
and L < .
@DHD
@qH
=
@qH
@qH
xH +
@xH
@qH
qH = xH +
@xH
@qH
qH ;
28
where
@xH
@qH
< 0. Then the sign of
@DHD
@qH
is ambiguous. Direct computations reveal that
@DHD
@qH
=
qH
h
4b (2qH   qL) (qH   qL)2   c (5qH   2qL) qL
i
    12q2H + q2L   6qHqL (qH   qL)2
(qH   qL)2 (4qH   qL)2
> 0
()  < H
where H 
qH
h
4b (2qH   qL) (qH   qL)2   c (5qH   2qL) qL
i
 
12q2H + q
2
L   6qHqL

(qH   qL)2
and H 2 (L; ). Finally,
@DD
@qH
=
@DLD
@qH
+
@DHD
@qH
=
@xL
@qH
qL + xH +
@xH
@qH
qH :
Again a priori the sign is ambiguous. Direct computations reveal that
@DD
@qH
=
cqL   4bqHqL + 8bq2H   bq2L   
 
4q2H + q
2
L   2qHqL

(4qH   qL)2
> 0 ()  < D
with D 
cqL + 8bq
2
H   bq2L   4bqHqL 
4q2H + q
2
L   2qHqL
 and D > H > L. Also    D > 0 () b < bD, where
bD 
c
 
q2H   qHqL + q2L

(4qH + qL) (qH   qL)2
and bD 2 [b; b^]. Summing up, we nd the following ranking:
 for b > bD, we have that L < H <  < D;
 for b 2 (b; bD), we have that L < H < D < .
Thus, for  2 (D; ), the sign of the derivatives are such that:
@DLD
@qH
> 0,
@DHD
@qH
< 0,
@DD
@qH
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
First, notice that
@DHD
@qL
=
@qH
@qL
xH +
@xH
@qL
qH . As
@qH
@qL
xH = 0, the sign of
@DHD
@qL
is the same as the
sign of
@xH
@qL
=
qH
h
c (5qH   2qL) + 2b (qH   qL)2 +  (qH   qL)2
i
(qH   qL)2 (4qH   4qL)2
> 0:
Then,
@DLD
@qL
=
@qL
@qL
xL +
@xL
@qL
qL = xL +
@xL
@qL
qL. The sign of
@xL
@qL
is ambiguous, so it is the sign of
@DLD
@qL
. Direct computations show that
@DLD
@qL
=
qH
h
c
 
4qHqL   6q2H   q2L

+ 4bqH (qH   qL)2 + 2qH (qH   qL)2
i
(qH   qL)2 (4qH   qL)2
> 0 ()  > GL :
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with GL 
c
 
6q2H + q
2
L   4qHqL
  4bqH (qH   qL)2
2qH (qH   qL)2
. Finally,
@DD
@qL
=
(6bqH   c+ 3qH) qH
(4qH   qL)2
> 0 ()  > GD:
with GD 
c  6bqH
3qH
.
Comparing the relevant thresholds, we nd that: GL  GD = 16 (qH   qL) 2 q 1H (4qH   qL)2 c > 0,
   GD =
(4qH   qL) [6qHb (qL   qH)  cqL]
3 (qH   qL) (3qH   qL) qH > 0, 
G
D    =
(3bqL   3bqH   c) (4qH   qL)
6 (qH   qL) qH < 0 and
GL  =
c
 
4q2H   3qHqL + q2L
  4bqH (qH   qL)2
2 (qH   qL)2 (3qH   qL) qH
(qL   4qH) > 0 () b <
c
 
4q2H   3qHqL + q2L

4qH (qH   qL)2

bG, with bG  bb = 14 (qL   qH) 2 q 1H (qL   3qH) cqL < 0 and bG   b = (3qH   qL)2 cqL4 (qH   qL)2 (qH + qL) qH > 0.
Summing up, the following ranking holds (and the proof comes from looking at the signs of the above
derivatives in the proper parametersranges):
 for b < bG, GD <  <  < GL ;
 for b > bG, GD <  <  < GL .
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